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There has been increasing interest in developing
simulation models capable of analyzing commer-
cial aircraft-cabin egress under both non-life-
threatening and life-threatening scenarios. At
issue is the ability to accurately simulate human
behavior within non-toxic environments, as well
as the debilitating effects that toxic environments
(e.g., fire and smoke) have on human-decision
making. A set of criteria has been identified by the
Federal Aviation Administration for developing
simulation models capable of analyzing commer-
cial aircraft-cabin egress. These criteria are used
to (a) compare the capabilities and limitations of
four aircraft-evacuation models in existence to-
day, (b) identify the issues that need to be ad-
dressed when developing these types of models,
and (c) propose a new paradigm for developing
aircraft-cabin egress models.
Keywords: Aircraft-cabin egress, aircrafts,
certification test, evacuation, human behav-
ior, FAA regulations
1. Introduction
Manufacturers of new passenger (commercial) aircraft,
and certain modified-passenger aircraft (e.g., an in-
creased number of rows to the original cabin design)
are required to show compliance with 14 Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, Part 25, Section 803, Emergency Evac-
uation. This requirement is frequently referred to as
The 90 Second Rule. The manufacturer must show that
with half of the available exits blocked, a full load of
passengers and crew (flight attendants, pilots, etc.)
can safely evacuate the aircraft into a darkened hangar
in 90 seconds or less. If the manufacturer’s evacuation
test is successful, the aircraft is deemed airworthy. If
the manufacturer is not successful, the test must be
run again until airworthiness is achieved, with each
test requiring an entirely new set of passengers and
crew. This requirement provides a performance-based
certification test of the emergency-evacuation system of
an aircraft.
Certification testing has proven to be quite stressful
and costly to the manufacturer. Today’s certification
test costs an average of $2.3 million, involves over
4,000 people, and requires three years of planning [1].
The costs rise exponentially if the manufacturer is not
successful on the first certification test (recall, the test
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must be conducted until airworthiness is achieved and
each test requires a new set of passengers and crew).
Adding to the monetary cost of every certification
test is the risk of injuries to the human-test subjects
(i.e., the passengers and crew). Thus, the requirement
to use children during certification tests was elimi-
nated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
in 1970. However, passengers subject to the highest
risk of injury have been women over the age of 50 [1].
For example, in October 1991, a 65-year-old woman
tripped at the aircraft exit of an MD-11. After falling
headfirst down an escape slide, she suffered a broken
neck and was left paralyzed [2]. Due to this and other
injuries, the FAA allowed modifications to The 90 Sec-
ond Rule. The manufacturer (McDonnell Douglas Air-
craft) was allowed to (a) use ramps rather than slides,
and (b) increase exterior illumination. When the manu-
facturer used the ramps and increased exterior illumi-
nation, there was a time penalty of 28 seconds imposed
on the second certification test. So rather than having
90 seconds to complete the evacuation, the evacuation
had be completed within 62 seconds. The penalty was
based on observing past certification test films where
about (a) 15 seconds was taken by the crew to inflate
the slide, and (b) 13 seconds in total hesitation time
was realized at the slide (i.e., passengers hesitated be-
fore jumping down a slide, but did not hesitate when
running onto the ramp) [2].
Consequently, there has been increasing pressure
to improve certification tests’ safety, even if the result-
ing tests give up some realism [3, 4]. Nevertheless,
there is one realism that certification tests have never
incorporated: the dynamic environment of an aircraft
cabin during an accident (i.e., fire and smoke). So
today’s certification tests do not provide the manufac-
turer, the airline industry, or the authorities (FAA) a
scientific means for predicting the evacuation perfor-
mance of passengers, crew and aircraft under various
parameters (e.g., number of disabled passengers, num-
ber and location of flight attendants, number and types
of exits, fire, and smoke).
2. Criteria for Developing Simulated Egress
Models
Since requiring manufacturers to perform certification
tests under actual accident conditions is ethically un-
acceptable, the need then exists to develop evacuation
models capable of simulating (a) various cabin con-
figurations, (b) the dynamic environment of fire, and
(c) passenger behavior. While the physical architecture
of the cabin and the spread of fire and smoke can be
modeled easily with today’s existing technology, at
issue is the ability to accurately predict human behav-
ior. More specifically, the issue is the ability to simu-
late the physical and psychological effects fire and
smoke have on human behavior and decision making.
The following was presented by Court and Marcus
[5] on behalf of the FAA, at the 1996 International
Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Devel-
opment (AGARD) Symposium on Aircraft Fire and
Safety, as the criteria for developing a simulated
egress model for studying aircraft-cabin evacuations:
1. The model must be capable of analyzing various
aircraft-cabin configurations without requiring
changes to its source code. This will give various
end-users (manufacturers, the FAA and airline car-
riers) the capability of analyzing an aircraft’s emer-
gency system without requiring them to be versed
in a specific programming language (or the model’s
logic) [4].
2. The model must run in real time or near real time.
This will support the ability to analyze the evacua-
tion procedures that are followed, and the impact
those procedures have on evacuation time and pas-
senger-survival rates.
3. The model must be able to conduct simulations of
both certification tests and accident evacuations.
4. The model must consider relationships among pas-
sengers. For instance, the impact on the evacuation
behavior of a parent traveling with an infant, versus
a passenger traveling alone, must be incorporated.
5. The model must consider the impact a flight atten-
dant’s behavior has on passengers. This feature will
allow passenger management to be explored, such as
determining the optimal number of flight atten-
dants per passenger load, or the optimal location
for each flight attendant, particularly for when
queues build in front of exits. Such a tool is non-
existent today. For example, the standard-evacua-
tion procedure is to have flight attendants stationed
directly at over-wing exits. However, it has been
demonstrated that placing them at the end of the
row (where the over-wing exit is located) allows
the flight attendant the capability of redirecting
passengers to other exits (which have no queue),
and thus reduces evacuation times [4].
6. The model must offer dynamic behavior as opposed
to behavior that is fixed at the time of model execu-
tion. That is, the model must allow the behavioral
characteristics of the passengers to change over
time. For instance, when passengers are exposed to
(or spend more time in) a life-threatening environ-
ment, they become more willing to take risks (e.g.,
jump over seats) [4].
7. The model must take into account the dynamic,
toxic environment of fire and consider the physical
as well as psychological effect of fire and smoke on
human behavior.
8. The model must support simulation output analy-
sis, designs of experiments, and sensitivity analysis.
Since the goal of the manufacturer is to perform
certification testing only once, data for statistical
analysis is non-existent. And, fortunately, commer-
cial aircraft accidents are rare events. In addition,
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most survivors are either (a) reluctant to be inter-
viewed, or (b) recall events out of sequence (or
with an inaccurate timetable) [4]. Thus, there is no
tool (or data) in existence that supports the goal of
identifying the most important factors influencing
passenger survival.
9. The model must provide animation of the evacua-
tions to support model validation and presenta-
tions.
10. The model should operate on a PC platform. This
will ensure the model is portable.
11. The model must have a high degree of user friend-
liness, again, so that the model can be used by a
wide set of end-users.
Notice that if this set of criteria is followed, (a) the
testing on evacuation systems of commercial aircraft
is moved into a more realistic, operational environment
(involving smoke, fire and the threat to human lives),
with no risk to human subjects; (b) manufacturers will
have access to a tool that is capable of evaluating con-
ceptual designs of various aircraft structures before
the production and certification testing phases; and
(c) airline carriers will be able to optimize emergency
procedures and personnel requirements by aircraft-
cabin type (model).
3. Commercial Aircraft-Cabin Egress Models
There are a limited number of models available for
conducting analysis on simulated aircraft-emergency
egress. In fact, most evacuation models of commercial
aircraft are not released to the public. The impedi-
ments for releasing these models are the regulations
and the constraints that the United States or other
governments could impose on the model developers
and end-users [6].
The following presents a literature survey on the
four aircraft-evacuation models in use today, their as-
sumptions, capabilities and limitations. I studied the
capabilities and limitations of these existing aircraft-
evacuation models over a three-year period (under an
FAA grant). The four models reviewed are the Gourary
Associates (GA) model, AIREVAC, EXODUS and
ARCEVAC. Since each model was funded by different
organizations, each has varied capabilities and limita-
tions.
Table 1 displays an overview of the four models as
based on the set of criteria established for aircraft-cabin
Table 1. Desired features of commercial aircraft evacuation models
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Figure 1. Gourary Associates (GA) model
egress models. The GA model was obtained and ex-
tensively studied for two years. The other models ei-
ther are not released to the public due to the funding
institution’s request, or are considered to be still in
the development stage. Those models were studied
via the model developer’s supplied documentation of
the model.
3.1 Gourary Associates (GA) Model
The Gourary Associates (GA) model, Version 6.02 [7,8],
is capable of simulating passenger egress from single-
aisle aircraft under both certification and accident
(fire and smoke) conditions. The software’s develop-
ment was initially funded by the Department of Trans-
portation through a Small Business Innovative Research
contract. The GA model runs on any personal com-
puter, produces a 2-D (top-down) view of the aircraft-
cabin interior and passengers, and runs at near real
time. An overview of the model, its files and interfaces
are shown in Figure 1. The software is written in
Microsoft BASIC, where the user enters input factors
on the (a) aircraft structure and its environment, and
(b) passenger data.
The GA model allows the user to control (a) the
number of rows within the aircraft, (b) the amount of
time to delay the opening of exits , (c) the movement
and speed of passengers through exits and within the
aircraft, (d) fire and smoke zones, inclusive of their
spread and intensity, and (e) the burn time of slides.
The user describes the passengers in terms of their
seating assignment (location), endurance, agility, age
and gender via the seating plan file. The user can also
control the reaction time of passengers through the
wake-up time assignment. Specifically, the wake-up
time is the amount of delay a passenger encounters
when trying to unbuckle his seat belt and initiate
movement. During accident investigations, it is com-
mon to find deceased passengers still in their seats
with their seat belts buckled [4]. Consequently, a large
wake-up time assignment for a certain percentage of
the passengers supports accident-reconstruction
analysis.
The seating plan file also contains the exit a pas-
senger is assigned to use during the evacuation, and
thus, generates the path for that passenger. The path
generated is based on the shortest feasible distance to
their pre-assigned evacuation exit. Passenger move-
ment towards their pre-assigned evacuation exits is
achieved by generating a set of random numbers from
an algorithm that uses the agility and endurance of
the passenger as input. However, passenger move-
ment can be impeded based on various blockages
(dead or incapacitated passengers, inoperable exits,
etc.).
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Passengers maintain their initial endurance and
agility levels in simulations not involving fire (certifi-
cation evacuations). If the simulation involves fire or
smoke, the endurance value of the passenger is con-
tinually reduced, based on the time the passenger is
exposed to the hazardous environment. This reduction
causes the probability of movement to decrease. If the
value of the endurance drops below a certain thresh-
old value (a global variable within the model), the pas-
senger is considered incapacitated. If the endurance of
the passenger falls further, the passenger is considered
dead, and could block other passengers’ movement.
The GA model’s three greatest assets are (a) the plat-
form, (b) the low level of computer knowledge re-
quired by the user, and (c) the ability to perform mul-
tiple runs. However, the GA model has the following
drawbacks that prevent it from being a versatile tool
for simulating aircraft egress:
1. The program can simulate only single-aisle aircraft
configurations, with a maximum of three seats per
row, on each side of the aisle. Hence, wide-body,
dual-aisle aircraft cabins cannot be simulated using
this model.
2. The architecture of the interior cabin is extremely
limited, even within the family ûf single-aisle air-
craft. That is, the configuration is limited to six ex-
its (i.e., one front, one back, and four over-wing
exits), where over-wing exits must be located at
the midway point of the cabin. For example, to
simulate an MD-80 aircraft cabin consisting of 38
rows where the over-wing exits are located at rows
23 and 24, 12 fake rows (non-occupied seats) must
be placed in the crash file for the over-wing exits to
be located at the correct row location [9].
3. The algorithm for movement is global in its ap-
proach and does not allow individual reactions to
external factors.
4. There is no capability of simulating human behav-
ior, only human movement.
5. In addition, there is no means to distinguish be-
tween the crew and passengers. Therefore, simu-
lating passenger and crew interaction is not pos-
sible.
3.2 AIREVAC
AIREVAC, developed by Schroeder and Tuttle [10],
and sponsored by the Air Transport Association of
America, is specifically designed for B-727 aircraft cer-
tification tests. The model cannot be used to simulate
any other aircraft configuration without reprogram-
ming the source code in Simscript. The original objec-
tive for its development was to investigate the impact
disabled passengers have on evacuation times. During
its development, Schroeder extended its applicability
Figure 2. AIREVAC model
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into a wider scope, a psycho-social model, in that it has
the capability of simulating passenger behavior dur-
ing evacuations.
The program uses many of the parameters com-
monly used by aircraft-cabin evacuation models, such
as the number of passengers, the location of each pas-
senger, and the speed of movement (reaction time). In
addition, however, the program uses a separate, exten-
sive set of psycho-social parameters to describe the
reaction of a passenger during the evacuation process.
Some of these parameters are the frustration index,
the dominance and submission level of the passenger,
and the passenger’s knowledge of exits and routes.
The AIREVAC model has a set of functional units
called evaluators (refer to Figure 2). Each of these evalu-
ators applies rule-based algorithms to determine pas-
senger movement during the evacuation process, and
communicates the outcome to other evaluators. The
various functional units of the model are the situation
evaluator, the motivation evaluators (general, submission
and altruism), the goal evaluator, the behavior evaluator,
and the outcome evaluator. Two authors are used to es-
tablish the settings for the physical environment of
the evacuation (situation author) and the passenger’s
physical and psychosocial characteristics (passenger
profile author). Physical characteristics are age, gender,
height, weight, disabilities and injuries. Psychosocial
characteristics are (a) cognitive variables, such as
general intelligence and knowledge of aircraft exits
and routes, (b) levels (dominance and submission),
(c) drives, such as the fear index and survival drive,
and (d) social variables, such as protector or Samaritan.
The following is a description of these evaluators [10]:
1. The situation evaluator uses the data from the situa-
tion author to establish the psychological and physi-
cal conditions during the evacuation, and generates
a situation and frustration index for each passenger.
The evaluator also establishes a hierarchy of escape
routes (paths) for each passenger.
2. The general motivation evaluator determines the net
motivational drive to escape. This is a pooled sum
of the variables representing the survival drive, the
fear index, the social variable (protector or Samari-
tan), and the frustration index.
3. The submission motivation evaluator program is only
called when a passenger encounters a block (e.g., a
passenger is competing with another passenger for
the right-of-way) in his movement and determines
whether an individual will assert himself or svbmit
(yield).
4. The altruism motivation evaluator determines an
individual’s tendency to help other passengers.
5. The goal evaluator determines which of the three
primary motivations, general, submission, or altnl-
ism, is the strongest. It then selects one of three
goals for the passenger: Escape, Yield, or Help, re-
spectively.
6. The behavior evaluator transforms the current stron-
gest goal (from the goal evaluator) into behavioral
action. For Escape, movement is continued on the
current path. For Yield, the passenger will stop his
movement and allow other passengers to occupy
his path. For Help, the passenger will assist the dis-
tressed passenger who is blocking his path. The
behavior evaluator then determines a specific be-
havioral outcome, or action (e.g., passenger unfas-
tens his seat belt, the passenger moves to the aisle,
the passenger pushes other passengers, the passen-
ger panics, the passenger falls).
7. The outcome evaluator executes the action requested
by the behavior evaluator, and updates the passen-
ger data files and graphic display.
Although AIREVAC allows the behavior and deci-
sion making process of human beings to be simulated
in great detail, the program has the following short-
comings :
1. The program can simulate only one type of cabin
arrangement at a time without reprogramming. To
reprogram, the user must have thorough knowl-
edge of the programming language Simscript and
the AIREVAC logic.
2. The program does not run at real time or near real
time. On the average, it takes several hours to run
a 90-second evacuation test [3].
3. There is currently no means to simulate the toxic
environment of smoke and fire.
4. The model cannot perform multiple, independent
simulation runs of the same evacuation scenario.
3.3 ARCEVAC
ARCEVAC is currently being developed by the Avia-
tion Research Corporation on behalf of the Transpor-
tation Development Center in Canada. It is a PC-based,
emergency-evacuation model that allows behavior of
all human occupants (passengers and crew) to be simu-
lated during egress [11J.
The model operates within a &dquo;windows-type&dquo; envi-
ronment, where the input data is entered through a
series of graphical user-interface windows. The ARC-
EVAC model has been designed around a variable-
parameters logic, where the user can opt to have the
algorithms run via supplied data, or the users can sup-
ply their own data to the algorithms. The advantage
of this model will lie in its ability to model a large set
of egress scenarios-from simple evacuations (where
behavioral aspects of the passengers and crew, and
hazardous environments are not considered), to com-
plex evacuation scenarios (where the physiological
and behavioral aspects of the passengers and crew,
and hazardous environments are considered). The
more complex scenarios will be established by having
the user provide detailed input parameters to the
model’s algorithms (e.g., heat index of the fire, location
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and smoke spread). That is, the user will be able to
&dquo;enrich&dquo; the model to the desired level of complexity.
ARCEVAC uses relative scales for quantifying the
passenger profile (distribution) through a Passenger
Selection Specification window. That is, the user supplies
data to a passenger description tree, consisting of three
branches. The first branch contains the percentage of
male versus female passengers, while the second
branch divides the male and female passengers into
two percentage categories: those below the age of 40
and those above the age of 40. The last branch divides
the age categories based on percentages with disabili-
ties (through a separate window interface). The passen-
ger description tree is further defined by providing
the passenger types: those traveling for pleasure and
those traveling for business. If passengers are traveling
together, they are then identified via a group definition
specification, indicating the group number, the group’s
size and group type (business, friend, or family).
Individual passengers receive their physical param-
eters (weight, height, cross-sectional area, agility and
ability to resist hazardous environments (endurance)),
and psychological parameters (group and individual
selfishness index), by assigning each category of the
passenger description a distribution. For example, the
percentage of men below age 40 is assigned a distri-
bution for their heights. The distribution is used to ob-
tain the individual passenger’s height value. All
physical distributions follow a truncated-normal dis-
tribution where the user must enter the minimum,
maximum, mean and standard deviation parameters.
The psychological characteristics are based on relative
scales (percentages). The selfishness and group selfish-
ness indices indicate the tendency of the passenger to
be selfish towards strangers (passengers not belonging
to the same group), and selfish towards those passen-
gers belonging to the same group, respectively.
A similar mechanism, the Crew Selection Specifica-
tion window, is used for defining crew types and their
behavior. However, the crew’s psychological profile
does not include the selfish indices. Instead, crew be-
havior is controlled through its mission type. The mis-
sion type indicates how the crew will assist passengers
in evacuating the aircraft (checking the aisles, opening
doors, etc.). The valor factor indicates how long the
crew will attempt their mission (assist passengers),
while the Crew Performance Table indicates how well
the crew accomplishes their mission. The Crew Perfor-
mance Table is a 6 x 6 matrix containing six crew per-
formance categories: excellent, good, fair, poor, none,
N/A (no crew is simulated, just passenger evacuation).
Once the crew member is assigned a performance cat-
egory, his ability to assist passengers is defined by a
set of six values: Range, P(Deterred), P(Depart), Check
Interval, Agility Modifier, and Exit Door Access Time.
For each crewmember’s performance category, these
values are defined as:
1. The effective distance the crew member’s voice can
be heard-Range.
2. The probability the crew member will deter
(change the behavior or direction of) a passenger-
P(Deterred).
3. The probability the crew member can remove a
passenger from a blocked exit queue-P(Depart).
4. The amount of time lag before the crew member
will initiate his mission-Check Interval.
5. The effect on passenger agility-Agility Modifier.
For example, if the crew member is categorized as
excellent, the Agility Modifier is 25%. So, if a pas-
senger responds to that crew member’s command
(e.g., moves away from a blocked exit), the passen-
ger’s agility level will be increased by a factor of
1.25.
6. Exit Door Access Time is the time it takes the crew
member to open an unblocked, unjammed exit.
During model execution, the mission assignment
for the crew is controlled via three modes: no mission
assigned, fixed mission assigned with no run-time
control, or fixed mission assigned with run-time con-
trol. If no missions are assigned, the model’s logic will
invoke the crew LU (ii the follow ing prioririzeu or-
der) : (a) guide passengers through exits, (b) assist im-
mobilized passengers, and (c) evacuate the crew. If
fixed missions are assigned, the user’s defined mis-
sion for the crew will be executed at the simulated
time, as specified by the user. If run-time control is
invoked by the user, the run-time mission commands
will take priority over the mission command compiled
at model execution. In other words, the user can
change the behavioral aspects of the crew during the
model’s run time.
The Human Behavior Specification window allows the
user to specify the percentage of passenger and crew
members who will respond in a Calm, Alert, Nervous,
Panicky, or Shock manner, by defining a cumulative-
percentage value for each of those manners, over the
range [0, 99]. Behavior Modifiers are events within the
evacuation (e.g., loss of illumination, flooding, or ex-
plosions) that can be triggered to impact the behavioral
responses of the passengers and crew. For example,
for a given percentage of the passengers, Calm may
be assigned the range 0 to 40; Alert, 41 to 63; Nervous,
64-80; Panicky, 81-90; and Shock, 91-99. Thus, 41% of
the passengers will remain calm, 23% will be alert,
17% will be nervous, 10% will panic, and 9% will be in
shock when the interior-cabin illumination is reduced
to zero.
The software incorporates graphics and animation
for the motion of the passengers and the conditions of
the aircraft cabin during the evacuation simulation.
The program is written in Borland C and C++ with
object-oriented features, such as generic-class librar-
ies. However, the present version of the model can be
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Figure 3. ARCEVAC window interfaces
used only for certification tests, while future versions
are expected to be used for simulating hazardous con-
ditions (fire, smoke and toxicity). The current advan-
tages of ARCEVAC are:
1. The high level of user friendliness and the lack of
knowledge required by the user to run the model.
That is, the user does not have to be versed in the
underlying simulation language.
2. The PC platform and the ability to run in real time.
3. The ability to simulate both human and crew be-
havior so that passenger management issues can
be explored.
4. The ability to link passengers to groups so that their
behavior responses are dependent on their internal
and external group classifications.
5. The ability to perform multiple simulation runs.
The major drawback to the ARCEVAC model is that
truncated normal distributions are used to assign the
physical and psychological characteristics of the pas-
sengers, and thus the user cannot assign features on
an individual basis. In other words, ARCEVAC takes
a global approach to the assignment of individual
physical attributes, as well as individual behavior.
Therefore, ARCEVAC does not support experimental
designs. That is, you cannot place the same set of pas-
sengers into various aircraft and treat their physical or
psychological characteristics as a controllable factor.
3.4 air-EXODUS
EXODUS is a suite of evacuation models currently be-
ing developed at the University of Greenwich. In its
infancy, EXODUS was used to simulate the evacuation
of large populations of individuals from mass transit
vehicles (e.g., trains and ships) and from buildings
(e.g., cinemas and lecture halls) [12]. The original pro-
gram was written in a programming environment
called G2 and ran on a SUN SPARC-1 station. Since
1993, EXODUS has evolved into two distinct packages:
building-EXODUS and air-EXODUS [13]. The former
is devoted to analyzing structural evacuations, while
the latter is specifically tailored for aircraft evacua-
tions. Both are on a PC platform and written in C++.
air-EXODUS is capable of simulating the interactions
of passengers, crew, fire and aircraft structures.
The behavior and movement of humans are driven
by a set of global and local heuristics and rules, as cat-
egorized by five submodels: Movement, Behavior, Oc-
cupant, Toxicity, and Hazard. The submodels’ opera-
tions are defined over a region of space within the
Geometry submodel. An overview of the submodels is
shown in Figure 4 and described below [12, 13] :
1. The Geometry submodel contains the physical
description of the aircraft’s interior, inclusive of
seats, aisles, windows, and exits. The interior is
represented by a layered network of nodes, where
each node contains the information about its single
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Figure 4. air-EXODUS submodel interaction (Galea, et al. [13], modified)
occupant (e.g., seat), and if pertinent, the environ-
mental conditions (temperature, carbon dioxide,
oxygen levels, etc.). Nodes are spaced about 0.5
meter apart throughout the interior of the cabin,
and are connected by a set of arcs. These arcs main-
tain feasible paths from one node to the next. In
other words, a passenger will occupy a set of nodes
and is not allowed to occupy (or move to) a set of
nodes representing an interior wall.
2. The Movement submodel controls the physical ’
movement (walking, crawling and jumping) of the
passengers from one set of positional nodes to the
next. It is responsible for determining whether the
passenger has the capability to perform the requested
physical action (via the Behavior submodel), by
interfacing with the Occupant submodel (that con-
tains the physical attributes of the passenger). For
example, the submodel ensures that the passenger
has the appropriate agility level to jump over a
seat before initiating that movement.
3. The Behavior submodel determines the response of
a passenger to the prevailing situations, based on
two rule-levels: global and local. Global rules gener-
ate an overall escape plan for each passenger based
on the nearest exit, or the exit he has been directed
to by a crew member. Local rules allow the indi-
vidual’s personal behavior attributes to operate in
two modes: normal or extreme. In the normal mode, a
passenger will adhere to the global behavior and
will respond immediately to crew member’s orders.
In the extreme mode, passengers are allowed to
ignore global behavior (e.g., move towards an exit
that is not the nearest exit). The Behavior submodel
passes the resulting decision (request for action) to
the Movement submodel.
4. The Occupant submodel describes five sets of char-
acteristics (attributes) for each passenger: physical
(age, weight, height, gender, endurance, and agil-
ity), time (reaction, seat-belt release, waiting, and
exit hesitation), hazard effects, positional (location
and distance traveled), and psychological (patience
and assertiveness). Some of these attributes are
fixed throughout the simulation, and some of the
factors change as the result of input(s) from other
submodels. For example, if during the simulation a
hazardous environment is invoked (e.g., smoke),
passengers will have their waiting time attributes
reduced. That is, passengers are more likely to tol-
erate longer queues during a non-life-threatening
evacuation than during a life-threatening evacua-
tion.
5. The Toxicity submodel is only activated when the
user specifies environmental conditions simulating
fire. Fire causes a variety of toxins (C02, CO, HCN,
etc.) to be released into the cabin, since much of the
cabin is constructed of synthetic materials. Conse-
quently, during accident investigations it is com-
mon to find that passengers are overcome by these
toxins before the fire reaches their locations [3].
The Toxicity submodel determines the effects these
toxins have on passengers, and communicates this
information to the Behavioral model, which in turn
passes it on to the Movement model. For example,
the Toxicity submodel determines the effect smoke
has on the passenger’s ability to travel, by identify-
ing a reduction in the passenger’s walking speed,
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sim.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
227
or by signaling to the Movement module that the
passenger must now crawl.
6. For simulations involving fire, the Hazard submod-
el controls the interior environmental conditions
(e.g., oxygen levels and heat intensity) through a
set of nodes located at two heights (in relation to
the passenger): head height and knee height. Note
that this submodel does not generate the initial fire
conditions, but relies on the user to enter the data
manually. This module also controls the timing of
the opening and closing of all exits.
The decision analysis performed within the Behav-
ior submodel is the crux of air-EXODUS. There are
five algorithms responsible for decision analysis within
the submodel: response time, conflict resolution, direction
changes, obstacle jumping, and exiting procedure. The al-
gorithms receive their data values on (a) each passen-
ger from the Occupant submodel, (b) the aircraft’s in-
terior architecture from the Geometry submodel, and
(c) the aircraft’s interior-atmospheric conditions from
the Toxicity submodel. Based on the algorithm invoked
and the resulting decision, a specific request for action
is sent to the Movement submodel. Each algorithm
has its own function and is described as follows:
1. The response time algorithm determines the time a
passenger consumes in getting out of his seat, as a
function of three time attributes: (a) reaction time,
. (b) the time the passenger will take to release his
~ 
seat belt, and (c) the time it takes for the passenger
~ 
to stand upright.
2. The conflict resolution algorithm is called upon
when two (or more) passengers wish to occupy the
same set of nodes at the same time. The passenger
with the highest assertiveness attribute is dominant
( and, therefore, will occupy the set of nodes) over
the passenger(s) with the lower assertiveness level.
3. The direction change algorithm is invoked when
any of these three events occurs: (a) a crew member
issues an order to the passenger that, if followed,
would divert the passenger from his intended
path, (b) the queue time incurred by the passenger
exceeds his wait time attribute, or (c) the passen-
ger encounters a concentration of toxins.
4. The obstacle jumping algorithm is triggered when
a passenger encounters either (a) an architectural
block (e.g., a seat or debris), (b) a slower passenger
and his patience level is exceeded, or (c) a dead
passenger.
5. The exit procedure algorithm considers the width
(from the Geometry submodel), the physical di-
mensions of the passenger(s), and the exit hesita-
tion (the passenger’s time attribute), to determine
the (a) maximum number of passengers that can
pass through an exit at the same time, and (b) the
time each passenger will take to pass through the
exit. For example, it generally takes more time for
a passenger to escape through an over-wing exit
than a floor exit (door exit). Additionally, more
passengers at one time can escape through a door
exit than through an over-wing exit.
air-EXODUS has many desirable features, includ-
ing an extensive graphical display of the movement of
each passenger during the simulation run. In addi-
tion, when simulating evacuations involving fire and
smoke, the model provides detailed information on
(a) the amount of toxins absorbed by each passenger,
and (b) the time taken by each passenger to exit the
aircraft (or the time until his/her death). The software
is capable of simulating both wide-bodied, dual-aisle
and narrow-bodied, single-aisle aircraft and is portable
across many types of platforms (e.g., PC Windows-
based and UNIX). On a 486/25 MHz machine, a simu-
lation run takes an average of three minutes to evacu-
ate 400 passengers (13].
The major disadvantages of air-EXODUS are:
1. The inability to simulate relationships among pas-
sengers. That is, the Behavior submodel only con-
siders the state of the cllrretlt passenger when invok-
ing its algorithms, since air-EXODUS has no means
to identify (or link) passengers. For example, the
obstacle jumping algorithm does not consider the
relationship of the slower passenger to the current
passenger. What if the slower passenger is the
child of the current passenger?
2. As with ARCEVAC, there is no means to use the
model for experimental designs. That is, there is no
means to control behavioral responses of the pas-
sengers from one replication to the next. Thus, it
would be difficult to identify the most important
factors influencing passenger survival between air-
craft types.
4. Proposed Approach
The four aircraft-cabin evacuation models reviewed
take a global approach to controlling the behavior of
their test subjects. That is, only one algorithm is used
for simulating the effects of external factors on the test
subjects (human beings) and thus, individual responses
to the same stimuli are not allowed. In addition, none
of the four models takes into account the relationships
among passengers.
More importantly, validation is critical to the suc-
cessful use of a model as a predictive tool and involves
testing to ensure that the model accurately reflects the
behavior of the real system. None of the literature
available on the four models addresses the issues in-
volved when validating the simulated egress behavior.
Of the paradigms available to date, object-oriented
programming (OOP) has two inherent features that
may lend it to modeling human behavior and decision
making during aircraft-cabin egress:
1. OOP lends itself to the modeling of complex sys-
tems by supporting modular construction.
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Figure 5. Actor-centered description [14]
2. OOP yields a one-to-one correspondence with the
physical world and, thus, eases the burden of
model validation.
In 1988, Burns and Morgeson [14] published a con-
struct for simulating systems involving endogenous
decision making that draws upon an object-oriented
paradigm. Their work proposes describing the system
in terms of a suite of actor classes (collection of object
classes) whose endogenous decisions impact the per-
formance and behavior of the system. They suggest a
model where all actors, including pseudo-actors (en-
vironment), follow an actor-centered description (Fig-
ure 5). Each actor class requires data structures (assets,
attributes and vulnerabilities) and methods (cognitive
and physical capabilities), described as follows:
1. Assets are discernible characteristics and attributes
are descriptive characteristics. The actor’s own as-
sets and attributes comprise the actual state, while
the perceived state is the actor’s perception of its
surroundings (the environment and other actors).
The state of the actor is the combined data struc-
tures of the actual and perceived state. This state
data is the input to the cognitive inference engine of
the actor.
2. The actor can physically move (transfer) or change
(transform). Transformation takes place by modify-
ing the actor’s assets/attributes. Vulnerabilities rep-
resent degradation to the actor’s capabilities via
the reduction or destruction of the actor’s assets.
3. An action space for cognitive capabilities and ac-
tivities describes the decision set and state of each
actor. A cognitive event (decision) is capable of (a)
delaying decisions, (b) invoking physical activity,
and (c) changing the action space. By delaying de-
cisions and changing the action space, an actor then
has the ability to &dquo;change its mind&dquo; (non-mono-
tonic reasoning).
However, the actor centered description proposes
by Burns and Morgeson [14] is not a pure object-ori-
ented paradigm, since knowledge bases (production
rules and heuristics) and inference engines are utilized
for achieving cognitive activity. This approach would
equate to developing data, knowledge, and method
structures for each actor (passenger) and pseudo-actor
(environment). Hence, the danger of adopting this ap-
proach is the possibility that the objective of support-
ing real-time simulation may not be met.
The proposed framework of Figure 6 incorporates
the actor-centered description (for passengers and the
crew), but avoids the use of knowledge bases and in-
ference engines by providing a pure object-oriented
paradigm. To achieve this pure objected-oriented ap-
proach, a new set of class objects must be defined
that contains (a) the data describing the environment
that the actors need to make decisions, and (b) the ap-
plicable rules (functions) for the actors when making
the decisions. In essence, the actors obtain their data
and functions by copying these new objects, or parts
of the new objects, into their own class definition
when making decisions.
The new class objects are the Coordinate, Navigate,
Advancement, Path, Responsibility, Panic and Block ob-
jects. These objects replace the knowledge bases and
inference engines of Burns and Morgeson [14], while
the Passenger and Crew objects generate the actor in-
stances representing the passengers and crew, respec-
tively. The environment (pseudo-actors) is represented
by the Fire, Smoke, and Toxicity objects. The Synchro-
nizer object is used to advance the simulation clock,
keep track of state of the environment, and invoke the
ordered movement of actors and pseudo-actors. An
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overview of the construct in Figure 6 is described be-
low :
1. The Coordinate object maintains the aircraft-cabin
architecture and generates, through its coordinate
functions, a map of the aircraft cabin for the Passen-
ger, Crew, Fire, Smoke, and Toxicity objects. The map
contains information on all of the exit, row, and
aisle locations. The Passenger, Crew, Fire, Smoke,
and Toxicity objects may copy the coordinate func-
tions of the Coordinate object. Thus, depending on
their capabilities, the Passenger, Crew, Fire, Smoke,
and Toxicity objects are able to store and update
their positions and distances from other objects.
2. The navigate functions of the Navigate object are
also available for the actor objects (Passenger and
Crew objects); and if applicable (for accident recon-
struction scenarios), for the pseudo-actors (Fire,
Smoke, and Toxicity objects) to copy. The navigate
functions allow the actors and pseudo-actors the
capability of choosing headings (direction) for
movement.
3. The Path object is called upon to generate possible
paths for the actors (Passenger and Crew objects)
and pseudo-actors (Fire, Smoke, and Toxicity objects)
based on their positions, headings, and cognitive
abilities to access the environment. In essence, the
Path object represents the eyes of the actors and
pseudo-actors. Again, how far the actor is able to
see depends on the defined capabilities of the actor.
4. The functions of the Advancement object are used to
move actors and pseudo-actors to their requested
positions.
5. Data from the Block object is used to keep actors
and pseudo-actors from moving into inaccessible
positions. The Block data types consist of architec-
tural (seats, walls, etc.), human (passenger and
Figure 6. Proposed object-oriented paradigm
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crew), and environmental (fire, smoke, and toxic-
ity) obstacles.
6. The Panic object directly influences the actor’s abil-
ity to reason and react. The Panic object is used to
degrade the actor’s assets/attributes and thus rep-
resents vulnerability. Degradation is realized by
the inability to call on other objects (send messages
or copy), such as the Advancement object. Again,
the call to the Panic object will depend on the ac-
tual and perceived state of the actor, and thus is a
function of the actor’s capabilities.
7. The Responsibility object is used to bind objects to-
gether. This is one of the vehicles used to establish
a psychological profile for each actor, as well as a
means to distinguish flight attendants and crew
members from passengers. A flight attendant is
expected to assist and direct passengers during an
evacuation. In this paradigm, a flight-attendant
actor has access to the internal data of other ob-
jects. This is achieved in object-oriented program-
ming by designating objects as friends to other ob-
jects. Friend-type objects also include passengers
traveling together. The amount of internal data
sharing depends on the relationship type and the
amount of responsibility an actor has toward an-
other actor.
Note, how ’capable’ the actor is at using the Coordi-
nate, Navigate, Path and Advancement objects depends
on its physical and cognitive capability objects. For
example, the possible paths a passenger can construct,
and how many times a new path is generated, depend
not only on how often the Path object is called upon,
but is also a function of the actor’s actual and perceived
states. Thus, path generation is a function of the type
of evacuation being performed (certification or acci-
dent reconstruction) and the actor’s (a) immediate en-
vironment (fire, smoke and toxicity levels), (b) ability
to access its current path and blockages, and (c) time
spent in hazardous environments.
The construct supports pre-defined biological hier-
archies but allows distinction between objects within
the same biological class. For example, although fe-
males have many similar physical characteristics, they
do not have the same physical capabilities; likewise,
they do not have the same cognitive reasoning abili-
ties. Thus, a distinction based on technical knowledge
can be made between a female passenger and a fe-
male flight attendant. That distinction is incorporated
through the ability to copy the Coordinate, Navigate,
and Advancement objects. The flight attendant is ex-
pected to have knowledge of the aircraft’s configura-
tion and therefore has more access to the functions
and data of the aforementioned objects than an aver-
age passenger does. Also, consider a female passen-
ger traveling alone versus one traveling with an in-
fant. The mother is bound to her child and, therefore,
would be expected to ensure that the child is evacu-
ated safely. In this construct, when the mother actor is
generated, a copy of the bonding function from the
Responsibility object is copied into the mother actor. The
mother actor is now tied to her child actor where the
child’s state is input to the cognitive object of the
mother actor.
The construct supports the objectives for develop-
ing aircraft-cabin egress models by supporting (a) a
varied passenger and crew profile, (b) a wide variety
of aircraft cabin configurations, and (c) the capability
of simulating various hazardous environmental con-
ditions.
The construct is currently being implemented at the
University of Oklahoma’s School of Industrial Engi-
neering. The study is at the validation stage, with
simulations being validated against actual certification
test data. The study is also identifying the physical
and psychological parameters most influential to pas-
senger survival. A preliminary set of parameters is
currently being incorporated into the model, as are
the environment objects of fire, smoke and toxicity.
5. Conclusions and Future Research
Of the four models reviewed, ARCEVAC and air-EXO-
DUS have the greatest potential for meeting the crite-LJ J. LJ
ria set by the FAA for simulating emergency egress.
However, none of the models reviewed supports the
execution of experimental designs. At issue is the abil-
ity to identify the most important factors of passenger
survival. The proposed model is capable of conduct-
ing experimental designs since physical, as well as
behavioral, characteristics can be treated as control-
lable factors.
Consequently, the proposed approach is the only
model aimed at analyzing the capability of an emer-
gency system to accommodate a wide variety of pas-
senger types (including both physical and behavior
profiles). Hypothetical scenarios that need to be ex-
plored by the new approach are, &dquo;What if the same
set of passengers were simulated to (a) behave in the
same way, (b) with the same emergency situation in-
voked, and (c) only the aircraft cabin’s interior archi-
tecture is changed?&dquo; That is, the question to be ex-
plored is, &dquo;When is behavior the deciding factor on
passenger survival, or when is the design of the
aircraft’s interior cabin the deciding factor?&dquo; Addi-
tionally, the emergency procedures during egress
need to be addressed and the number (or placement)
of flight attendants within the aircraft should be ana-
lyzed for optimal scenarios.
For the model developer, however, there is an un-
avoidable question: to what degree (if any) of liability
is he to be held accountable if an accident results in
human injuries or deaths, and his model was used to
assist (a) the manufacturer in designing the aircraft’s
emergency system, and/or (b) the airline carrier in es-
tablishing evacuation procedures, or flight attendant
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sim.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
231
manpower and location requirements? While the ques-
tions for the authorities, however, are:
1. &dquo;Are computer-based simulations an improvement
to the current (performance-based) certification
test?&dquo;
2. If the answer above is yes, then, &dquo;To what degree
will (or should) computer-based simulations of an
aircraft’s emergency system replace (or supple-
ment) the requirement of certification testing?&dquo;
3. And then, &dquo;What will be (if any) the model valida-
tion requirements imposed on software developers
before the model can be used for replacing or
supplementing the current certification tests?&dquo;
In general, the consensus is that for a more realistic
test of the aircraft’s emergency system to be performed,
simulation must be an integral part of that system’s
evaluation. Therefore, future research must be aimed
at developing, validating and implementing simula-
tion models for certification and accident investigation
purposes [3]. This opens a new area of research for
simulation-validation techniques-validating human
behavior and decision making, particularly under life-
threatening scenarios. Currently the approach is to
rely on accident and certification data. Recall, how-
ever, that the majority of certification tests are only
performed once, and, luckily, commercial aircraft-
accidents are rare events. Then how will these models
be validated against samples of size one? Current re-
search is aimed at determining what behavior is com-
mon among all types of emergency egress (e.g., build-
ing evacuations) and extending that historical data-
base across various scenarios.
6. References
[1] Shook, W., Senior Analyst for McDonnell Douglas Aircraft,
Technical Meeting: FAA Evacuation Model Parameter Sensitivity
Study, University of Oklahoma, School of Industrial Engi-
neering, March 6, 1995.
[2] Dornheim, M.A. "Evacuation Tests Without Slides Approved."
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 61, January 1993.
[3] Marcus, J. "A Review of Computer Evacuation Models and
Their Data Needs." Department of Transportation/Federal
Aviation Administration Technical Report: DOT/FAA/AM-
94/11, Washington, DC, 1994.
[4] Marcus, J.H., Manager of the Protection and Survivability
Laboratory, for the Federal Aviation Administration at the
Civil Aeromedical Institute, Technical Meeting: FAA Evacua-
tion Model Parameter Sensitivity Study, University of Okla-
homa, School of Industrial Engineering, November 10, 1994.
[5] Court, M.C. and Marcus, J. "Use of Object Oriented Program-
ming to Simulate Human Behavior in Emergency Evacua-
tion of an Aircraft’s Passenger Cabin." AGARD Conference
Proceedings 587: Aircraft Fire Safety, Chapter 34, pp 1-7, 1997.
[6] Schroeder, J.E. Technical Discussion (via Telephone): FAA
Evacuation Model Parameter Sensitivity Study, University of
Oklahoma, School of Industrial Engineering, October 1994.
[7] Gourary, B.S. "Simulation of Evacuation from a Single-Aisle
Airplane: A Comprehensive Report." Gourary Associates
Inc., Montclair, NJ, 1993.
[8] Gourary, B.S. "PC-Based Simulation of the Evacuation of Pas-
sengers from a Transport Airplane." Gourary Associates
Inc., Montclair, NJ, 1994.
[9] Jayarama, S. and Court, M.C. "Evacuation Model Parameter
Sensitivity Study: Project Progress." Technical Report,
School of Industrial Engineering, University of Oklahoma,
January 1996.
[10] Schroeder, J.E. and Tuttle, M.L. "Development of an Aircraft
Evacuation (AIREVAC) Computer Model, Phase I: Front
End Analysis and Data Collection." Technical Report: SwRI
Project Number 12-4099, Southwest Research Institute, San
Antonio, TX, 1991.
[11] Aviation Research Corporation. "Development of ARCEVAC
An Emergency Evacuation Simulation Model&mdash;Beta Version
1.0." Transport Canada Technical Report: rjs-92-122, Trans-
portation Development Center, Montreal, Canada, 1994.
[12] Galea, E.R. and Galsarsoro, J.M.P. "EXODUS: An Evacuation
Model for Mass Transport Vehicles." Civil Aviation Author-
ity Technical Report: CAA Paper 93006, London, 1993.
[13] Galea, E. R., Owen, M. and Lawrence, P. "The Role of Evacua-
tion Modelling in the Development of Safer Air Travel."
AGARD Conference Proceedings 587: Aircraft Fire Safety, Chap-
ter 36, pp 1-12, 1997.
[14] Burns, J.R. and Morgeson, J.D. "An Object-Oriented World-
View for Intelligent, Discrete, Next-Event Simulation." Man-
agement Science, Vol. 34, No. 12, pp 1425-1440, 1988.
7. Additional Reading
Lewis, C. and Cherry, R.G.W. &dquo;Technical Evaluation Report:
AGARD- Propulsion and Energetics Panel-88th Symposium
on Aircraft Fire Safety.&dquo; AGARD Conference Proceedings 587:
Aircraft Fire Safety, Tl-T19, 1997.
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016sim.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
